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PHILOSOPHY AND DESIGN OF
MODERN FRESH START POLICIES:
THE EVOLUTION OF CANADA'S
LEGISLATIVE POLICY©
BY JOHN D. HONSBERGER, Q.C.*
The fresh start concept-the restoration of a bankrupt
to his or her former debt-free status-originated in the
United States. While lip service is paid to it in Canada,
the author's review of the English origins and
subsequent evolution of Canadian bankruptcy
legislation indicates that a strong commitment to the
fresh start policy has never been the Canadian
philosophy. Rehabilitation of the debtor is not a matter
of great concern in Canada. Indeed, the Canadian
legislative policy has always been restrictive of the
rights of debtors. With the passage of amendments to
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BiA) in 1992 and
1997, the Canadian legislation now is increasingly so
with the new rules, new conditions, new restrictions,
and new penalties placed in the way of debtors' access
to a discharge and a fresh start for bankrupts.
Le concept du nouveau d6part-le retour d'une
personne en faillite son statut de non-
d6biteur-trouve son origine aux Etats-Unis. Bien
qu'on parle du concept au Canada, t'auteur r6examine
les origines anglaises et 1'6volution subs6quente de la
16gislation canadienne sur la faillite, et d6montre que la
politique du nouveau d6part n'a jamais fait parti de la
philosophie canadienne. La r6habilitation du d6biteur
n'est pas d'une grande importance au Canada. En fait,
la politique 16gislative canadienne a toujours 6t6
restrictive quant aux droits des d6biteurs. Avec le
passage des amendements de la Loi sur la faillite et
l'insolvabi6td en 1992 et en 1997, la loi canadienne est
de plus en plus la mime, ayant de nouveaux
rglements, de nouvelles restrictions, et de nouvelles
peines qui font obstacle A l'accas des d6biteurs A
'acquittement et au nouveau d6part pour les personnes
en faillite.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is an old story about an Irishman who was asked how to get
to a certain village. The Irishman thought for a while and then said, "If I
had wanted to go there I wouldn't have started from here." Any attempt
to enunciate or design a modern fresh start policy for bankrupts must
start from where we are. It is well to know, too, how we got here and from
where. The Canadian search must begin in England, because much of our
bankruptcy legislation, attitudes, and values are derived from English
precedents and traditions. It is also well to be reminded of the
fundamental purpose of bankruptcy, and of the symmetry of the
bankruptcy system, when tracing the evolution of Canada's fresh start
policy.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF
BANKRUPTCY AND A DISCHARGE
The fundamental purpose of bankruptcy legislation, as it has
always been understood, is the liquidation of the debtor's estate and its
division among the debtor's creditors. This, however, does not mean quite
the same thing today as it did before World War II, since more and more
debtors-particularly consumer debtors-have no estate to be liquidated.
The fundamental purpose of the discharge, which relates to the
effect bankruptcy has on the liability of the bankrupt, is to facilitate and
maximize the liquidation of the debtor's estate. Increasingly, the
discharge is considered to be a means to other economic and social ends.
It does represent, however, a gradual realization that in many cases, the
bankrupt might properly be considered an object of pity. This is the basis
of the fresh start concept.
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III. ORIGIN OF THE FRESH START CONCEPT
One of the earliest expressions of the fresh start concept
appeared in the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Williams
v. U.S. Fidelity Co., where it was said:
It is the purpose of the Bankrupt Act to convert the assets of the bankrupt into cash for
distribution among creditors and then to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of
oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.1
This statement was followed and quoted with approval by the Court in
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,2 in which it was said:
The power of the individual to earn a living for himself and those dependent upon him is
in the nature of a personal liberty quite as much as, if not more than, it is a property right.
To preserve its free exercise is of the utmost importance, not only because it is a
fundamental private necessity, but because it is a matter of great public concern. From the
viewpoint of the wage earner there is little difference between not earning at all and
earning wholly for a creditor. Pauperism may be the necessary result of either .... The new
opportunity in life and the clear field for future effort, which is the purpose of the
bankruptcy act to afford the emancipated debtor, would be of little value to the wage
earner if he were obliged to face the necessity of devoting the whole or a considerable
portion of his earnings for an indefinite time in the future to the payment of indebtedness
incurred prior to his bankruptcy.3
The Supreme Court of Canada, shortly thereafter, said much the same
when it wrote that "[t]he purpose and object of the Bankruptcy Act is to
equitably distribute the assets of the debtor and to permit of his
rehabilitation as a citizen, unfettered by past debts."4
In their respective articulations of the purpose of bankruptcy
legislation, both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court of Canada conceived the fresh start as the restoration of the
bankrupt to his or her former debt-free status. (The courts were referring
to business debtors, not consumer debtors.) This interpretation matches
the definition of "rehabilitation" in the Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary as a restoration to a previous condition.5 A broader definition
1 236 U.S. 549 at 554-55 (1915), McReynolds J. [hereinafter Williams]. The term "fresh start"
probably originated in the United States Supreme Court decision in Wetmore v.Markoe, 196 U.S. 68
at 77 (1904).
2 292 U.S. 234 at 244 (1934), Sutherland J. [hereinafter Local Loan Co.].
3 Ibid. at 245.
4 Industrial Acceptance Corp. v. Lalonde [1952] 2 S.C.R. 109 at 120, Estey J. [hereinafter
Lalonde].
5 See The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3d ed., s.v. "rehabilitation."
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of rehabilitation is now favoured. This excludes any concept of the
restoration of a bankrupt to his or her previous condition, which is now
deemed not to be desirable. It means instead a change in the economic
attitudes and values of a bankrupt to ones that are more socially
acceptable, and will improve his or her social and economic situation. 6
The modern interpretation of rehabilitation, which is often used in the
place of a fresh start, reminds us of Humpty Dumpty, who said in rather a
scornful tone, "When I use a word it means just what I choose it to
mean-neither more nor less." 7
IV. THE ROLE OF EQUITY IN LEGISLATIVE
AND JUDICIAL POLICY
The Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of the Bankruptcy
Act in Lalonde,8 when it said the object of the Act is to distribute the
assets of the debtor equitably, is a reminder that bankruptcy has always
been within the jurisdiction of the courts of equity. There are many
equitable maxims that apply to bankruptcies and discharges, and to a
fresh start in particular, including: "Those who seek equity must do
equity;" "those who come to equity must come with clean hands;"
"equality is equity;" "equity imputes an intention to fulfil an obligation;"
and "equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy." Judicial and
legislative policy is often based upon, or influenced by, these equitable
principles. Equity has had, and should continue to have, a strong
influence on the development of fresh start policies.
V. ENGLISH LEGISLATION
The first English legislation to show apparent concern (and I use
the word "apparent" advisedly) for the rehabilitation of the debtor (and
"rehabilitation" was not used as we now understand it) was enacted in
1705 in the feign of Anne.9 The discharge provided by this statute was not
6 See generally J. Lee, "What Shall We Do for the Consumer Bankrupt?" (1970) 44 J. Nat'l
Assoc. Ref. Bankr. 9.
7 L. Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland & Through the Looking-Glass (New York:
Penguin Books, 1960) at 188.
8 Supra, note 4.
9 SeeAn act to prevent frauds frequently committed by bankrupts, 1705 (U.K.), 4 Anne, c. 17
[hereinafter 1705Act].
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designed out of consideration for the debtor, but was intended, rather, to
be a reward for debtors who cooperated in the administration of their
estates. The penal provisions preceding the 1705Act, which related to the
duty of debtors to surrender their estates for administration, had not
evoked satisfactory cooperation. The legislators sought to do better. A
debtor who was a merchant, for example, could get a discharge of all his
debts owing at the time of bankruptcy, provided he surrendered all of his
property and conformed to the other provisions of the statute. The
legislators, however, remained very much aware of the continuing
problem of the fraudulent debtor. So, while given new privileges, the
debtor had to be free from fraud and submit himself to the control of the
court.
The severity of the penalty for failing to strictly comply with the
law was evidence of the concern that debtors might abuse the privileges
given to them. In the past, the penalty had been to stand in the pillory or
to have an ear cut off. The new penalty was hanging. This penalty applied,
for example, if the bankrupt failed to surrender himself to the court,
committed perjury on his examination, or fraudulently concealed his
assets.10
Another early concern of Parliament-of increasing
contemporary concern as well-was that a debtor might enter bankruptcy
without any assets to be divided among his or her creditors, and still seek
a discharge. For example, The Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849
required a petitioner for bankruptcy to state that he "verily believes that
he can make it appear to the Satisfaction of the Court that his available
Estate is sufficient to pay his Creditors at least Five Shillings in the
Pound." 11 If this could not be proved to the satisfaction of the court, the
petition was dismissed.12 To this point there was still no concern with the
rehabilitation of the debtor; the principal concerns were the creditor's
welfare, and that equity was done. If the debtor brought nothing into
bankruptcy, could the debtor in good conscience expect to take anything
away? A debtor who seeks equity must do equity.
10 See The Hon. R.H. Eden, "A Practical Treatise on the Bankrupt Law, as Amended by the
New Act of the 6 Geo. IV c. 16" in T.I. Wharton, Esq., ed., The Law Library (Philadelphia: John S.
Littell, 1842) Vol. XIX at 292, in which The Honourable Robert Henley Eden wrote that
[t]he punishment of death for not surrendering or submitting to be examined, or for
concealing property, was first introduced by the 4 and 5 Ann [sic], continued by the 5
Geo. 1, and afterwards by the 5 Geo. 2, c. 30; and it was not till the reign of his present
majesty that the penalty was changed to the milder one of transportation ....
The statute of "his present majesty" is 1821 (U.K.), 1&2 Geo. IV, c. 115.
11 (U.K.), 12 & 13 Vict., c. 106, sch. 0.
12 Ibi.j s. XCIII.
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It was difficult to prove at the commencement of a bankruptcy
that the assets of a debtor were sufficient to pay his creditors at least five
shillings in the pound. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Act, 1854 came up
with a different formula; it required the debtor to make it appear that his
available estate was at least sufficient to produce the sum of 150
pounds.13 If the debtor could not prove this, his petition was dismissed.
Although there were many other English bankruptcy statutes that
became drafting precedents for early Canadian bankruptcy legislation,
they were all similar in concept to the statutes of 1849 and 1854. There
was no concern with the rehabilitation of the debtor; all that mattered
was maximizing the realization of the debtor's estate for the benefit of the
creditors. But there was a price to pay for being accepted into bankruptcy
and receiving the reward of a discharge: a debtor had to bring into court a.
bare minimum of assets to be applied against the claims of creditors.
VI. PRE-CONFEDERATION CANADIAN LEGISLATION
When the laws of England were introduced into Upper Canada in
1792, all laws in relation to bankrupts were excluded.14 However, by the
time of Confederation in 1867, insolvency legislation had been adopted in
Upper and Lower Canada, and in Nova Scotia. Although they were not
then members of Confederation, British Columbia, Prince Edward
Island, and Newfoundland had also adopted bankruptcy legislation.
The pre-Confederation legislation of the Province of Canada,
(i.e., Canada East and Canada West, now Ontario and Quebec), evolved
into the first federal post-Confederation legislation. The Parliament of
the Province of Canada passed a general bankruptcy law in 1843, which
repealed an earlier Ordinance of 1839.15 The 1843 Act had stringent
discharge provisions. If the debtor made full disclosure of his estate and
effects "and in all things conformed himself to the provisions of this Act"
he would be discharged of his debts due at the date of his bankruptcy.16 A
13 (U.K.), 17 & 18 Vict., c. 119, s. XX.
14 See An act to repeal certain parts of an Act passed in the fourteenth year of His Majesty's Reign,
entitled, "An act making more effectual provision for the government of the province of Quebec, in North
America and to introduce the English law as the rule of decision in all matters of controversy, relative to
property and civil rights," 1792 (U.K.), 32 Geo. III, c. 1, preamble.
15 See An Act to repeal an Ordinance of Lower Canada, intituled, An Ordinance concerning
Bankrupts, and the administration and distribution of their estates and effects, and to make provision for
the same object throughout the Province of Canada, 1843 (Can.), 7 Vict., c. 10 [hereinafter 1843 Act].
16 1biL s. LIX.
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discharge would not be given, however, if the debtor had incurred certain
types of debts through wagering or gaming; if he concealed, mutilated, or
destroyed any of his books, papers, or records; if he made false entries in
his accounts with the intent to defeat his creditors; if he concealed any
part of his property; or if he did not disclose any false proof of claim
within one month after becoming aware of it.17
The discharge provided by the 1843 Act favoured creditors, and
was very much a reward to the honest debtor with an unblemished record
who assisted to the utmost in the administration of his estate. If, however,
the debtor had engaged in certain conduct before proceedings were
commenced, he was absolutely disentitled to a discharge. Even when
authorized, a discharge was given reluctantly. The 1843 Act was
predominantly creditor oriented, as was other English legislation at that
time.
Three years before Confederation, the 1843 Act and amending
Acts expired and were replaced by The Insolvent Act of 1864.18 In Lower
Canada this Act applied only to traders, but it applied to all persons in
Upper Canada. Its discharge provisions19 were similar to the 1843 Act but
with a new, and moderately more liberal, provision: if after one year from
the date proceedings had commenced the debtor had not obtained the
required proportion of creditors to consent to his discharge, he could
make an application directly to the court for a discharge.20
VII. POST-CONFEDERATION CANADIAN LEGISLATION
The first federal statute for bankruptcy and insolvency after
Confederation was The Insolvent Act of 1869.21 It was very similar to the
pre-Confederation 1864 Act but with harsher discharge provisions. These
provisions required the debtor to first obtain the consent of a majority of
creditors who, respectively, were creditors for amounts of one hundred
dollars and upwards, and who represented at least three-quarters or more
of the debtor's liabilities.2 2 The debtor was then required, on notice to all
creditors, to apply to the court to confirm the discharge. If any of six
17 Ibid. s. LX.
18 (Can.), 27-28 Vict., c. 17 [hereinafter 1864Act].
19 Ibid. s. 9.
20 Ibid. s. 9(10).
21 (Can.), 32-33 Vict., c. 16 [hereinafter 1869 Act].
22 Ibid. s. 94.
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grounds of opposition were proved, the court was required to refuse the
discharge 23 However, if there was insufficient evidence to sustain any of
these grounds, but any of another five grounds were proven, the court
could suspend the discharge for a period not exceeding five years, declare
the discharge to be "of the second class," or do both.24
A discharge "of the first class" was awarded to the debtor whose
insolvency arose out of unavoidable losses and misfortunes; that is, the
honest and unfortunate debtor. All other debtors who were granted a
discharge were branded with a second class discharge. This was much like
the early New England practice, described in Nathanial Hawthorne's The
Scarlet Letter,25 of forcing a woman who had committed adultery to wear
the letter "A." A second class discharge was intended to keep the
disgrace of bankruptcy alive forever, or at least as long as the bankrupt
lived. Undoubtedly this was intended to distinguish the "better" kind of
bankrupt from the disreputable kind, to allow the trading community to
avoid giving credit to those who had already shown themselves unworthy
of it. A discharge, once obtained, whether of the first or second class, did
not apply to eleven separate classes of debt if the creditor did not file a
proof of claim.26
The legislative policy respecting discharges under the 1869 Act
was that a discharge would be granted only grudgingly and with little, if
any, concern for the debtor. Like the 1705Act, it was a reward granted to
those debtors who assisted in the administration of their estates. There
was otherwise no concern for the debtor's rehabilitation, nor any thought
of a "fresh start."
The year 1880 marked the beginning of a new period concerning
Canadian legislative policy for discharges. Between 1874 and 1878 a
serious depression resulted in many commercial failures. This caused
much public resentment, particularly in Western Canada; while eastern
farm-implement dealers were able to use the 1869 Act when they could
not meet their debts, western farmers-unable to meet the classification
of "trader" under the Act-had to pay what they owed in full. These and
other grievances led in 1880 to a repealing statute,27 by which the federal
government abandoned its legislative role in the bankruptcy and
23 IbidL s. 101.
24IbidL s. 103.
2 5 See N. Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter (New York: Bantam Books, 1981).
26 See 1869Act, supra note 21, s. 100.
2 7 SeeAn Act to repeal the Acts Respecting Insolvency now in force in Canada, 1880 (Can.), 43
VicL, c. 1.
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insolvency area. It would seem that it felt it was dealing with a politically
sensitive topic and was glad to get out of the bankruptcy business. At this
point, it is safe to say that there was no federal legislative policy
respecting a fresh start.
It was soon found, however, that without insolvency or bankruptcy
legislation there was no way to wind up insolvent companies. Boards of
trade in most large cities passed resolutions requesting new legislation.
As a result, the federal government passed An Act respecting Insolvent
Banks, Insurance Companies, Loan Companies, Building Societies and
Trading Corporations,28 later to be known as the Winding Up Act.29 Since
this was the only federal insolvency legislation, restricted in application to
insolvent companies, the provincial legislatures were compelled in the
interest of commercial discipline to exercise their much less extensive
powers. Quebec had former articles 763-780 of its Code of Civil
Procedure,30 and the commorm l4w provinces adopted assignments and
preferences legislation.31 Y
What characterizes the provincial legislation, and since 1919 has
distinguished it from the federal bankruptcy and insolvency legislation, is
that a creditor cannot force a debtor to make an assignment. Further;
once an assignment is made, there is no provision permitting a debtor to
make an arrangement with his or her creditors, and a debtor does not
receive a release of his or her debts. Again, a creditor retains its claim for
the balance outstanding after receiving its dividend and, by obtaining
judgment, prevents the debtor from resuming business (at least in his or
her own name) even if the other creditors are willing to release the
debtor. Many debtors stopped paying taxes, limited their occupational
efforts, and often deserted their families.
Debtors who wished to return to business were often driven to
means flavouring of trickery and deception to re-establish their
livelihood. A number of strategies were used. Debtors might leave the
country, carry on business in the names of wives, incorporate limited
liability companies, obtain precarious credit, await the operation of the
statute of limitations, or obtain a discharge from those creditors who were
willing to grant it, and settle with or pay the others.
28 1882 (Can.), 45 Vict., c. 23.
29 R.S.C. 1886, c. 129.
30 See Arts 763-80 C.C.P. (1888).
31 This legislation is still in effect. See, for example, Ontario, Assignments and Preferences Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. A-33.
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It would be valuable to have a profile of the insolvent debtors who
made assignments under provincial assignments and preferences
legislation. It would seem that by far the majority, indeed almost all, were
business and professional men. There were few, if any, consumers among
insolvent debtors, since there was little consumer credit at the time, and
few consumers would have had enough property to assign to pay even the
costs of administration.
There were some insolvent debtors who did not mind the fact that
they could not get a discharge. Apparently they were able in some way to
support themselves and their dependants, although there is very little
discussion of their situation in either newspapers or professional journals
of the day, and when the debate began it related only to traders3 2 It
would be interesting to know what percentage of our present-day, low-
income consumer debtors care if they have access to discharge facilities.
A groundswell of support gradually developed for the passage of
bankruptcy legislation that would apply across the country. This resulted
in 1919 in the Bankruptcy Act.33 It was described as a war measure. In the
debate in the House of Commons it was said: "We must be prepared
when the war comes to a close, to be able to handle the situation which is
bound to arise in this country as a result of the long-continued
struggle ... ."34 There was reference also to the need to separate the
"sheep" from the "goats," and "[w]hen the court is of the opinion that a
debtor has been obliged to assign through misfortune, he shall be given
the necessary relief."35 This sounds similar to the fresh start concept
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court just a few years earlier in
Williams.3 6 Canada, however, did not have the same view of the fresh
start. It did not then and has not since gone as far as the United States
did in implementing An Act To establish a uniform system of bankruptcy
throughout the United States.37 This American Act effectuated a fresh start
policy, which provided that property acquired after the filing of the
petition belongs to the bankrupt, free of the claims of creditors as of that
32 See, for example, "Insolvency Legislation" Editorial Comment (1899) 35 Can. L.J. 179.
33 1919 (Can.), 9 & 10 Geo. V, c. 36 [hereinafter 1919Act].
34 House of Commons Debates (27 March 1918) at 206 (Mr. Jacobs).
35 Ibid.
3 6 Supra note 1.
3 7 c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) [hereinafter BankruptcyAct 18981.
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date38 Rather, the 1919Act provided (as the current Canadian legislation
still does) that "all property which may be acquired by or devolve on [the
bankrupt] before his discharge" vested in his trustee.39
The United States Bankruptcy Code does not allow a conditional
or suspended discharge.40 A discharge is either granted or it is refused.
The Canadian 1919 Act provided that the court could either grant or
refuse an absolute discharge, suspend it for a specified time, or grant an
order subject to any conditions requiring the debtor to turn over part of
his or her earnings41 The court was compelled to refuse a discharge in a
few situations "unless for special reasons the court otherwise
determines ... ."42 The court was also required to refuse a discharge 43
make a conditional discharge,44 or suspend a discharge for not less than
two years4S where there was proof of any of eleven specified facts.46 The
fact most frequently proved was that the assets of the bankrupt were not
of a value equal to fifty cents on the dollar of his or her unsecured
liabilities, but in this case the suspension could be for less than two
years.47 Invariably, when the assets were less than fifty cents on the dollar
38 The current United States Bankruptcy Code provides that all of a bankrupt's property as of
the commencement of the case becomes property of the estate: see 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1998)
[hereinafter Bankruptcy Code].
39 1919Act, supra note 33, s. 25(a).
40 It has been proposed from time to time that the United States Bankruptcy Code should be
amended to include a conditional or suspended discharge. President Hoover's Message to Congress
on 29 February 1932, S. Doe. No. 65, at XII (1932), said in part,
The discretion of courts in granting or refusing discharges should be broadened, and they
should be authorized to postpone discharges for a time and require Bankrupts, during the
period of suspension, to make some satisfaction out of after acquired property as a
condition to the granting of a full discharge.
In the Handbook of the Law of Bankruptcy (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1956) at 113, James A.
MacLachlan wrote of the proposal that,
[i]t evoked much opposition. The preponderantly conservative membership of the
National Bankruptcy Conference and others found that this foreign innovation would
confer undue powers on the individual judge and create a condition of semi-peonage or
subserviency on the part of the bankrupt which was not in accordance with the best
American tradition.
41 See 1919Act, supra note 33, s. 58(4).
42 Ibid. s. 58(5).
43 Ibi s. 58(5)(a).
441bid.
45 Ibid s. 58(5)(b).
46 Ibid, ss. 59(a)-(k).
4 7Ibid. s. 58(5)(b).
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the suspension was for three months or so, provided there was no other
improper conduct on the part of the debtor.
After a year from the time that a conditional order was made, the
court could modify the order if the bankrupt proved there was no realistic
probability of his or her being in a position to comply with the terms or
conditions of the order.48 Once a discharge was ordered, all but four
classes of debt were released.49 While on the face of the 1919 Act the
discharge provisions appeared to be harsh, there was considerable
flexibility enabling the court to reach an appropriate compromise
between the conflicting interests of the creditors and the bankrupt in the
event that the conduct of the bankrupt was not what it should be.
For the most part, the discharge provisions worked reasonably
well. Unexpectedly, however, a large number of bankrupts did not apply
for their discharges. No attempt seems to have been made over the years
to ascertain why this was so. Many bankrupts, perhaps, did not know that
they were entitled to apply. Others might not have wanted to make the
effort. Still others might have been deterred by the cost. However, the
most compelling reason why so many did not apply for a discharge is
undoubtedly that they felt they did not need it. This was because they had
so little property-and so little expectation of acquiring any-that
creditors might seize, or because they did not intend to go into business in
any significant way. Some debtors might not have cared whether they
obtained a discharge, and might have considered that they could get by
without one. Whatever the reason, the experience under the 1919 Act and
the earlier experience under the assignments and preferences legislation
is likely to influence modern legislative policy concerning a fresh start.
After twenty years, it became apparent that the 1919 Act could
and should be improved. A new Act was almost completely drafted by
1939, but the war delayed its finalization until 1949.50 Although enacted
in 1949, it represents the thought and policies of 1939. With substantial
amendments, the 1949 Act is the present Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act
(BIA).S
4 8 Ibid. s. 58(5).
49 Ibid. ss. 61(1)(a)-(d).
50 See BankruptcyAct, 1949 (Can.), 13 Geo. VI, c. 7 [hereinafter 1949Act].
51 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 [hereinafter DtA], as am. by An Act to amend the Bankruptcy Act and to
amend the Income Tax Act in consequence thereof, S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 2 [hereinafter 1992
Amendments].
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The intention of the 1949 Act was said to be "to clarify and
simplify the legislation." 52 One innovation was the introduction of a
summary administration for small estates, which provided an economical
and inexpensive alternative to the old provisions. 53 This made it easier for
a small debtor to enter bankruptcy voluntarily. The principal innovation,
however, was the provision for an automatic application for a discharge
once the bankruptcy proceedings were commenced.5 4 It was intended to
facilitate the procedure for a discharge, and to reduce the number of
undischarged bankrupts. The number of debts not released by a discharge
was expanded to seven55 from the four types that appeared in the 1919
Act.5 6
Concern over the rising number of consumer bankruptcies began
to develop in the 1960s.57 Some asked whether the traditional bankruptcy
process could provide an adequate remedy to the problem of the
insolvent consumer. The cost of a trustee was one stumbling block. The
Superintendent of Bankruptcy developed an ad hoc system whereby
trustees were made available at a reduced cost to indigent consumers.
Several Western provinces enacted orderly payments of debts
legislation, which permitted debtors to make, at a minimal cost, an
arrangement with their creditors for the payment of all or part of the
debts as an alternative to bankruptcy. This permitted the debtor to
maintain his or her self-respect and to learn how to handle his or her
finances. However, in 1960 the Supreme Court of Canada held that
Alberta's The Orderly Payment of Debts ActS8 was ultra vires the provincial
legislature as encroaching upon the federal jurisdiction over bankruptcy
and insolvency.5 9 The Alberta legislation had not been proclaimed, but a
similar Act of the province of Manitoba had been in force since 1932.60
52 Canada, Bankruptcy and Insolvency: Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Legislation (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970) (Chair: R. Tass6) at 17 [hereinafter
"Tass6 Committee"].
53 See 1949Act, supra note 50, s. 114.
54 Ibid. s. 127(1).
55 Ibid. ss. 135(1)(a)-(g).
56 See note 49, supra.
57 This was one of the reasons for the appointment of the Tass6 Committee in 1966. The rising
number of consumer bankruptcies was frequently referred to by organizations that submitted
written memoranda to the Committee.
58 S.A. 1959, c. 61.
59 See Validity of The Orderly Payment of Debts Act, 1959 (Alta.), [1960] S.C.R. 571.
60 See Orderly Payment of Debts Act, S.M. 1932, c. 34.
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Both Manitoba and Alberta then requested the enactment of federal
legislation of the same character as the provincial legislation.
There was no sense of urgency on the part of the federal
government to amend the federal bankruptcy legislation, but it finally
agreed, and in July 1966 it amended the Bankruptcy Act by adding Part
X.61 The amendment provided for an orderly payment of debts scheme
substantially similar to the earlier legislation in Alberta and Manitoba.
The payment of debts could be extended, but the debts had to be paid in
full. A discharge was not available. Part X was only available in those
provinces that requested it to apply to them and were prepared to pay the
cost of its administration.
Federal legislative policy at the time was to go slow, perhaps with
the thought that if nothing was done the problem would go away.
However, the federal government came under increasing pressure to do
something. It accordingly appointed the Tass6 Committee in 1966 "to
review and report on the bankruptcy and insolvency legislation of
Canada."62 The Tass6 Committee presented its report in 1970. Among a
great many other matters, it expressed concern over the social dimensions
of bankruptcy, the rehabilitation of debtors, and the bankrupt's need for
an opportunity to make a fresh economic start. It said in this regard:
The Social Dimension of Bankruptcy: From the social point of view, the fact that a citizen is
over-burdened with debts or harassed by his creditors may be the source of much evil.
Through his inability to solve his financial problems and support himself and his family,
much hardship and unhappiness may result to him, his family and the country at large.
"The tensions built up in harassed individuals and families frequently contribute to family
breakdown, mental illness, crime and economic dependency."
Bankruptcy is, today, the "escape door" to the harassed or over-burdened debtor. In the
past, it has taken many other forms. We have seen, for example, how, in ancient times, a
debtor would pledge and, perhaps later, sell his wife and children to escape the barbaric
punishment that was the fate of those who could not pay their debts in full. In the Middle
Ages, it was a common practice for such a debtor to escape his creditors by becoming an
outlaw or by fleeing the country. Whenever the right to bankruptcy as an "escape door" is
restricted, or when it is too difficult to become bankrupt, there is a great danger that
debtors will resort to crime and desert their families they can no longer support and their
responsibilities they can no longer face.
There is also a great social waste in having a large class of harassed or over-burdened
debtors and of undischarged bankrupts. One of the principal objectives of the new act
should be to minimize this waste and to make the most of the human resources
represented by this group of debtors. Speedy and effective measures to promote their
social and economic rehabilitation are imperative. A debtor should be able, and should be
encouraged, to make an arrangement with his creditors, when he has the ability to pay his
61 SeeAn Act to amend the Banknuptcy Act, S.C. 1966, c. 32, s. 22.
62 Tass6 Committee, supra note 52 at xi.
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debts in whole or in part. When the burden of debt becomes too great, a debtor should not
be prevented from entering bankruptcy. Once in bankruptcy, a debtor should be
encouraged, subject to appropriate safeguards, to become, as quickly as possible, a self-
supporting and productive member of his community. Measures must also be designed to
protect the discharged debtor from the pressure of creditors endeavouring to persuade
him to undertake to pay his discharged debts, thereby defeating one of the primary
purposes of the Act.
The System must Facilitate the Rehabilitation of the Debtor: Indeed, we believe that, in
respect of the individual debtor, the principal objective of the bankruptcy system should be
to rehabilitate him and give him an opportunity to make a fresh economic start in life.
Whether the debtor is good or bad should not affect his right in this regard. All debtors
should be encouraged to become self-supporting as quickly as possible and be protected
from the harassment of their creditors. There should be no bar to a debtor seeking
employment, retaining what he earns and providing for the care and security of himself
and his dependants. Equity would, however, demand that, where a large amount of
property is retained by a bankrupt by reason of the appropriate exemption statutes, his
right to be released of his debts should not be absolute. Equity would also demand that, if
a debtor, within a certain period of time after his bankruptcy, acquires great wealth, he
should be called upon to share it with his creditors.
This approach would emphasize, as we think it should, the civil, as opposed to the quasi-
criminal, character of the bankruptcy process. The fact that the debtor has committed an
offence for which he would have an answer under relevant statutes should not deprive him
of the opportunity to make a fresh economic start in life.63
The report was accepted almost in its entirety and it might be said that it
represented a legislative fresh start policy. The government's political
will, however, began to waver. Several bills for new acts were introduced
in Parliament but were never passed and were allowed to lapse.
In the meantime, a new problem arose. For several reasons, the
agricultural industry suffered from a severe economic depression in the
1980s. When lenders attempted to foreclose on farm mortgages, several
farmers responded with acts of civil disobedience. The Department of
Consumer and Corporate Affairs, which had the legislative responsibility
for bankruptcy and insolvency, dithered. Eventually, the Department of
Agriculture, with some exasperation, proposed the Farm Debt Review
Act,64 which was enacted in 1985. During the debate on the bill, the
minister of agriculture said that it was intended to help farmers with
potentially viable operations to remain in business.65 In other words, a
fresh start was provided for those who had the capacity to use it.
The recessions of the 1980s and 1990s led to a dramatic increase
in bankruptcy filings, and aroused concern on the part of government, the
63 Ibid. at 86-87 [footnote omitted].
64 R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 25.
65 See House of Commons Debates (20 June 1986) at 14,790 (Mr. Wise).
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courts, and others. There was a feeling that somehow the moral fabric of
society had been weakened. Insolvent debtors were criticized for doing
what the BI permitted them to do. The critics argued that bankruptcy
was not a process to be used by a debtor to avoid his or her
responsibilities to the maximum extent that the debtor was able to do
so. 66 Likewise, they complained it was an abuse of the BIA for a debtor to
go into bankruptcy as a convenient means to evade payment of just
obligations, and to obtain a discharge without difficulty.67
It was apparent that the stigma of bankruptcy was not preventing
the door to the bankruptcy court from being thrown wide open.68 The
reaction was much like it was when all of a sudden an acorn fell and hit
Henny Penny on the head. She rushed into the barnyard and shouted,
"Goodness gracious, the sky is falling." The result has been much
legislative tinkering that was not always well considered.69
Under the BIA, first-time bankrupts can receive an automatic
discharge unless there is an objection.7 0 This provision, however, was
designed as much to relieve over-burdened courts as to assist bankrupts.
Generally, the legislation as it affects individual debtors has become
harsher. The legislative policy of a fresh start is qualified. First, a new
regime for consumer proposals, in addition to the existing provisions on
66 See Re Junger (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 86 at para. 16 (Ont. S.C.).
67 See Re Posner (1960), 3 C.B.R. (N.S.) 49 at para. 19 (Man. Q.B.), Ferguson J. quoting with
approval from Lalonde, supra note 4.
68 There was an underlying assumption in the old bankruptcy legislation that there was an
economic and social stigma attached to bankruptcy. Most people took pride in paying their debts
and it was a matter of shame for them and their families when they could not. The disgrace of
bankruptcy is no longer what it was. An increasing number of persons accept bankruptcy as a
solution to their financial troubles. To many, what is legally right is morally right, and individual
bankruptcy is not a disgrace but just smart business tactics: see F.C. Fields, "Needed Changes in
Individual Bankruptcy" in Proceedings of Oklahoma Institute of Consumer Credit Management for
1959 (Oklahoma City: Oklahoma City University, 1959) at 7. However, the Tass6 Committee, supra
note 52, wrote, at 55, that "It]he disgrace of bankruptcy, more than any legal sanction, effectively
removed the bankrupt from business and thereby protected both the business community and the
public from the incompetent or dishonest businessman." See also The Gallup Organization, The
Public's Attitudes TowardBanlouptcy (Princeton, N.J.: The Gallup Organization, 1966).
69 See Statute Law (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) Amendment Act, R.S.C. 1985
(1st Supp.), c. 31, ss. 3, 28, 69-77; Farm Debt Review Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 25; An Act to
amend the Judges Act and other Acts in relation to judicial matters, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 27,
s.10; 1992 Amendments, supra note 51; Miscellaneous Statute Law Amendment Act, 1993, S.C. 1993,
c. 34, s. 10; Miscellaneous Statute Law Amendment Act, 1994, S.C. 1994, c. 26, ss. 6-9; and An Act to
amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Income
TaxAct, S.C. 1997, c. 12 [hereinafter 1997Amendments].
70 See Bin, supra note 51, s. 168.1.
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the orderly payment of debts, has been established.7 1 Second, debtors
who can make a viable proposal primarily by the use of after-acquired
salary, wages, or other remuneration are penalized if they instead choose
bankruptcy. 72 Third, debtors who choose bankruptcy can be required to
make payments from their excess income during and after the
administration of their bankruptcy, as established by directives of the
Superintendent of Bankruptcy.73 It is relevant to note how far Canada has
digressed from the philosophy of Local Loan Co.74 (although admittedly
never the philosophy of the Canadian legislation), which held that the
power of an individual to earn a living for himself and his dependants is a
personal liberty as much as, if not more than, it is a property right.
Further changes among the recent amendments that qualify a
fresh start policy include the provision that debtors are obliged to submit
to counselling,75 and the restrictions placed on the discharge of student
loan debts.76 Significantly, the number of debts that are not released by a
discharge have grown from four in the 1919 Act to seven in the 1949 Act
and to nine in the 1997 Amendments.77 The quasi-criminal nature of
bankruptcy has also been revived. Although fraudulent and dishonest
bankrupts should be penalized, it would seem more appropriate, in order
to preserve the integrity of the BiA, to use the criminal law to punish them
rather than bankruptcy law.
Presumably the thrust of these amendments is to assist creditors.
However, when taking into account the mark-up usually made by
commercial creditors on goods and services for bad debts (compared to
the actual level of default), and the ability to write off losses against
profits for income tax purposes, their actual losses are minimal. The
amendments also fail to take into account the effect on bankruptcy filings
of the greatly expanded availability of credit. Even though irresponsible
borrowing by debtors is criticized, the irresponsible extension of credit is
not. Similarly, debtors are penalized for not paying off student loans,
which are often so large as to be unmanageable, while there is little
criticism of our governments' failure to extend public education beyond
the secondary school level. Governments, even if they do not encourage
71 Ibid. ss. 66.11-66.4 (Consumer Proposals), as am. by 1992 Amendments, supra note 51, s. 32.
72 See BLt,supra note 51, s. 173(1)(n), as am. by 1997Amendments,supra note 69, s. 103(1).
73 See Bt4, supra note 51, ss. 68.1, 170.1.
7 4 Supra note 2.
75 See BA, supra note 51, s. 157.1, as am. by 1992 Amendments, supra note 51, s. 58.
7 6 See BL4, supra note 51, s. 178(g), as am. by 1997Amendments, supra note 69, s. 105.
7 7 See BM, supra note 51, s. 178, as am. by 1997Amendments, supra note 69, s. 105.
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students to borrow beyond their means to obtain a higher education for
the ultimate benefit of society, have stood by and condoned the practice.
While some students may borrow from governments with no intention to
repay, there are debtors who borrow money for other purposes with no
intention to repay, without being subject to comparable penalties.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The most recent legislative tinkering is myopic in locating the
reasons for consumer bankruptcies. There has been little distribution in
the assignment of responsibility. While lip service is paid to a fresh start
philosophy, the legislative policy is more restrictive than it formerly was.
There are new rules, new conditions, new restrictions, and new penalties.
We have moved from "a society being governed by the rule of law to a
society governed by the law of rules."78 This is particularly true to the
prospect of obtaining a fresh start. We seem to have moved backwards. A
Kafkaesque situation has developed regarding discharges in bankruptcy
and the fresh start for bankrupts. If the average layperson understood
how the system has evolved and what it has become today, he or she
would find it ridiculous and depressing. A maximum of effort, verbiage,
rules, conditions, penalties, guidelines (both administrative and judicial),
rationalizations, and struggle are used to produce a minimum of definite
and understandable results, and to produce for us the most expensive
system in the world.79
78 The Hon. R. Silverman Abella, "Address" (American Bar Association Convention,
Toronto, 31 July 1998) [unpublished].
79 This is based upon a statement by Daniel Cowans, a former bankruptcy judge, in D.R.
Cowans, Bankruptcy Law and Practice (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1963) at 101, when discussing the
nature of a discharge. His words have been slightly paraphrased and expanded.
